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

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MICHAEL RUTHERGLEN

Gerard Manley Hopkins to Robert Bridges, 1879: "But as air, melody, is what strikes me most of all in music and design in painting, so design, pattern, or what I am in the habit of calling 'inscape' is what I above all ~~in~~ aim at in poetry. Now it is the virtue of design, pattern, or inscape to be distinctive, and it is the vice of distinctiveness to become queer. This vice I cannot have escaped" (*Corres.*, 1: 334). Certainly it caught him in "The Sea and the Skylark," a sonnet that tends toward the sheer musicality it ascribes to its titular bird:

> Left hand, off land, I hear the lark ascend,
> His rash-fresh re-winded new-skeinèd score
> In crisps of curl off wild winch whirl, and pour
> And pelt músic, till none's to spill nor spend. (*PW*, p. 143; ll. 5–8)

Writing three years later to Bridges, to whom the sonnet evidently gave much trouble, Hopkins blames its opacities on a fascination with *cynghanedd*, the "consonant chiming" characteristic of Welsh poetry. Consonance may overwhelm the poem's *englyns*, or "sense," which "gets the worst of it" in the confrontation with sound. "In this case it exists," Hopkins writes, "but is far from glaring." He then glosses these lines with evident discomfort ("it is dreadful to explain these things in cold blood") and complains of the trouble their composition cost him (*Corres.*, 2: 551–552). But with the sense of the bird obscured by the very lines meant to render it, the question arises as to what, exactly, Hopkins won by his work. For the lilt of the lines is not that of the lark, nor is their design or patterning meant to mime its flight. Read together, letter and poem raise the question not only of what inscape is but also of what inscapes Hopkins was aiming at.

In light of the intricacy of "sprung rhythm," the prosody Hopkins developed (and resorted to musical notation in order to explain), distinctive

"design" and "pattern" seem inadequate as answers to the first question. Surely a poet who wrote (again to Bridges), "With all my ~~lin~~ licences, or rather laws, I am stricter than you and I might say than anybody I know" (*Corres.*, 1: 280), and whose poetry seems so continuous with the self-imposed rigors of his poetics, must have coined "inscape" with something extremely particular in mind. But this assumption runs swiftly into the inconsistencies in Hopkins's use of the term, which make it seem expressively expansive rather than discursively precise. A narrow definition has proved elusive, but the broad and broadly held interpretation of inscape as the essential "distinctiveness" or singularity of a thing remains feasible, despite its falling short of the perceptual intensities to which Hopkins attaches his term. Nonetheless, presuming this interpretation, which is not unreasonable so much as incomplete, the question remains as to his poetic "aim." Critical consensus, hardened around the idea that his poems are essentially mimetic, holds that he intended them to render the inscapes of stones, clouds, trees, people, and especially birds, to represent these things in all their adamant specificity, and thereby to affirm divinity's presence in the world. As one commentator representatively has it, "Hopkins actually held that poetry can 're-present' the inscapes he had gleaned *as such*."[1]

Yet this answer contradicts Hopkins's stated views. "Poetry," he claimed in the lecture notes "On Poetry and Verse," is "in fact speech only employed to carry the inscape of speech for the inscape's sake."[2] It is not the inscapes of the *things in* his poems but of their words themselves when read aloud, their very aural materiality, that was his aim. The repetition of the sounds of words, he goes on to argue, heightens the sense of this inscape at the expense of other kinds of linguistic meaning—"grammatical, logical, historical"—on which mimetic readings depend. That critics have tended to offer such readings stems in part from their treating Hopkins's poems as they do his journals, in which he does indeed labor to describe the inscapes of (usually natural) things, and in part from a misreading of Hopkins's relation to Duns Scotus, the thirteenth-century Franciscan whose theology he cherished. The resemblance of inscape to Scotus's principle of individuation, *haecceitas* or "thisness," is often marshaled to make Hopkins's term appear as though it names a quality more conceptually definite than it does and therefore one more easily representable. Yet Hopkins coined "inscape" and "instress" in 1868, while he did not come across Scotus's work until 1872; and when he did, it was in fact the conceptual *un*intelligibility of *haecceitas* that he found so affirming, its role in a model of perception that turns on non- or even anticonceptual cognition. In this, Hopkins resembles no one so much as Martin Heidegger, whose *Habilitationsschrift* partially on Scotus finds in *haecceitas* the justification for a pretheoretical mode of knowledge

cognate to what Hopkins meant (in part) by his other term, "instress." In effect, instress forms the subjective pole of a heightened perception, the objective and reciprocal counterpart to which is inscape. By aiming at the latter, Hopkins intended to evoke the former. The sonic densities of his poems are meant to make the inscapes of *speech* unmistakable, that the reader might thereby experience instress, the perceptual state in which things can appear viscerally singular and meaningful. Having so appeared, they can be valued and nurtured accordingly: Hopkins hoped his poems might reinvigorate his readers' sense of the natural world, such that they would be driven to protect it as a treasury of inscapes. His poetics has, finally, a moral aspect.

The interdependence of inscape and instress is best approached from the side of the former, as its scope is far narrower than that of the latter.[3] Even so, inscape has long beguiled commentators, largely on account of Hopkins's contrasting uses of it. It appears most frequently in his journals, not only in relation to different numbers and kinds of things—discrete flowers and artworks, arrangements such as night skies and landscapes—but also as different parts of speech, and precipitating a solid definition out of its fluid significations has proven difficult. The prevailing understanding of it as the singular and ultimately divine "selfhood" of a thing remains workable but demands significant elaboration.[4] First, this singularity or "distinctiveness" arises from the patterned, and therefore the repeated, parts of a thing. In a mountain pasture, Hopkins observes "Two plants especially with strongly inscaped leaves. . . . The bigger-leaved one has the leaves seven-lobed and each lobe paged so as to take shadow and shadow" (*Diaries*, p. 445). As the focus in this description is on subleaves and lobes and the multiplication of shadows, so another entry on flora focuses on repeated symmetries in the form of axes: "The bluebells in your hand baffle you with their inscape, made to every sense: if you draw yr. fingers through them they are lodged and ~~drag~~ ^struggle / with a shock of wet heads;^ . . . the inscape of the flower most finely carried out in the siding of the axes, each striking a greater and greater slant, is finished in these clustered buds" (*Diaries*, p. 510). Hopkins details a kind of fractal self-similarity emerging from the flower's repeated features to constitute its overall individuality. The inscape is carried by and comprises the axes. In an entry on a sunset, by contrast, the sun's being "quite out of gauge," too bright relative to its surroundings, renders the scene a congeries of sunset-parts that feed back into no unity, and Hopkins must shift his perspective: "before I had always taken the sunset and the sun as quite out of gauge with each other, . . . for the eye after looking at the sun is blunted to everything else, and if you look at the rest of the sunset you must cover the sun, but today I inscaped them together and made the sun the true

eye and ace of the whole" (*Diaries*, p. 484). Used as a verb, "inscape" implies an act of discernment, as if Hopkins were a photographer "seeing" a landscape where others might see only land. The inscape is not *the* singularity of the sunset but, rather, as the suffix "-scape" suggests, a *perception* of it as formally unified and singular. And although Hopkins insists that inscapes surround us, his observation that a violet "ran through" several in withering implies that they are not simply and statically there to be perceived (*Diaries*, p. 513). Rather, they can change and must be "caught" (Hopkins's preferred term). They may also gather, as in his experience of a Scottish landscape, in which accretive unity replaces the violet's successive differences: the single, "fine inscape of the Castle rock and of Arthur's ~~s~~ Seat and Sailisbury" is stopped from "growing" on him because of a lack of time. He apprehends it, but as he cannot linger over the scene as he would like, the inscape never rises to the full intensity that its lesser form suggests (*Diaries*, p. 517).

Thus wedded to perception, "inscapes" are largely, if not entirely, intuitive. The experience of inscape is anticonceptual, eschewing the mind's habit of abstraction in favor of sensuous immediacy and specificity. Bluebells *baffle* with their inscapes, and the sketch of Hopkins's hurried trip to Edinburgh entails not only that the presence of a thing (which a concept of it can dispense with by definition) is necessary to the apprehension of its inscape but also that its persistent presence can magnify that apprehension.[5]

This crucial dimension of the term marks its overlap with the theology of Duns Scotus, in particular with his concept of *haecceitas* ("thisness"). Contra the primacy of intellection in the dominant Thomistic paradigm, Scotus's model of perception ran from intense and intuitive particularity (the *this*ness of a thing) toward its abstracter nature (*quidditas*, *what*ness), from "intuitive" to "abstractive cognition."[6] And what the former, also called "simple apprehension" (*simplex apprehensio*), allowed people to cognize were objects both *as present* and, to some degree, *as singular*.[7] Hopkins refers to *haecceitas* in a meditation on the word "pitch," asking whether it is "the same as Scotus's *ecceitas*?"[8] before elaborating "pitch" as "that inmost self of mine which has been said to be and to be felt to be, to taste, more distinctive than the taste of clove or alum, the smell of walnutleaf of hart'shorn" (*SD*, p. 151). Such talk of distinctiveness raises the specter of inscape, which Hopkins links to Scotus in a journal entry, noting, "just when I took in any inscape of the sky or sea I thought of Scotus" (*Diaries*, p. 532).

This remark does not, of course, specifically connect inscape to *haecceitas*, and it must be noted that the two terms are not equivalent.[9] As the essential and absolute individuality of a thing, *haecceitas* transcends human perception.[10] More to the point, Hopkins read Scotus years after he coined

"inscape."[11] But the epistemological implications of Scotus's notion, along with his focus on the incarnation, were congruent with Hopkins's passionate belief in God's presence in the singular things of the world.[12] Furthermore, as indeterminate as the similarities between inscape and Scotus's account of cognition and individuality may be, their number makes it hard to imagine what else of the theologian's Hopkins might have been thinking of upon inscaping sky or sea. But to identify inscape as simply intuitive, singular content is to say little, and not wanting to say it is perhaps why critics prefer to focus on what conceptual sense Hopkins made of his perceptions.

Yet a more explicit understanding of this kind of content and its particular kind of meaningfulness is possible. Its great thematizer was Martin Heidegger, in whose hands "phenomenology becomes a way of letting something shared that can never be totally articulated and for which there can be no indubitable evidence show itself."[13] Interpreting Scotus in his 1916 *Habilitationsschrift*, Heidegger affirmed precisely the same intuitive dimension of the schoolman's thought. *Haecceitas* and simple apprehension helped him to articulate an early version of the pretheoretical mode of cognition that was to be central to his phenomenology. If the absolutely singular is intelligible in some way, then there is more to intelligibility than can be theorized. There is irreducible, lived singularity: "*Individuum* implies determinateness as this unique one, that can be encountered at no other time or place. . . . The individual is an *irreducible ultimate*. . . . The form of individuality (*haecceitas*) is to furnish a primal determination of the really actual. This really constitutes an 'insurveyable multiplicity,' an 'heterogeneous continuum.'"[14] The fact of singularity means, in S. J. McGrath's pithy formulation, that "*the conceptual and objectifiable is not co-extensive with the understandable: the latter exceeds and delimits the former.*"[15] As Scotus himself asserts, of *haecceitas* "there is no science" (p. 93). For Heidegger, the "oneness and onceness" of things render them accessible only to phenomenology, which strives to let them show themselves apart from any theory of them. Or, in John Van Buren's account, it strives to speak of them as if each were a proper noun, for instance, a philosopher's patronymic: "The family name 'Heidegger,' 'Heidegger's *Sache*,' has only the analogical unity of identity-in-difference, because it is defined by a fundamental heterothesis and haecceity."[16] Integrally knowing such a unity is not a matter of propositional or conceptual knowledge but rather demands a "reversal in conceptuality," a stripping away of concepts in order to arrive at a more essential, intuitive understanding.

Hopkins's remarks on Scotus are nowhere as explicit as Heidegger's, but a commensurate knowledge seems at issue in what he terms "instress," a

"running" variant of which he mulls in a journal entry: "And what is this running instress, so independent of at least the immediate scape of the thing, which unmistakeably distinguishes and individualises things? Not imposed outwards from the mind as for instance by melancholy or strong feeling: I easily distinguish that instress. I think it is this same running instress by which we identify or, better, test and refuse to identify with our various suggestions / a thought which has just slipped from the mind at an interruption" (*Diaries*, p. 519). It is not by virtue of its conceptual content that a momentarily lost thought is retrieved but rather its fit with an inchoate intuition in the thinker's mind. And whichever of the suggestions fits, it does so absolutely, unmistakably, and above all naturally, "imposed" neither by mind nor mood. The tendency to individualize, to take up *this* suggestion and no other, marks the connection with inscape. Together, instress and inscape form the subject- and object-poles of the vivid, nonconceptual experience of a thing; they are reciprocal moments of its perception.[17] As such, either can provoke the other: Hopkins apprehends the inscape of an upland heath despite the presence of a friend, a condition in which "the eye and the ear are for the most part shut and instress cannot come" (*Diaries*, p. 544), implying that instress is an attunement necessary to the "catching" of any inscape. Another entry reverses the order, with the ruins of a castle causing him to have "an instress which only the true old work gives from the strong and noble inscape of the pointed arch" (*Diaries*, p. 611).

This experience coincides strikingly with what Heidegger would come to call "disclosure," an incipient version of which his *Habilitationsschrift* argues for via Scotus: the "truth of *simplex apprehensio*, of simply having an object, doesn't have falsity as its contrary, but *non-cognizance*, *a not knowing*" (pp. 85–86). The awareness of something's being singularly present is not a matter of intellectual verification. It is in relation to this reading of Scotus that one can best triangulate Heidegger with Hopkins, who makes much the same point in terms of simple affirmation: "I have often felt when I have been in this mood and felt the depth of an instress or how fast the inscape holds a thing that nothing is so pregnant and straightforward to the truth as simple *yes* and *is*" (*Ox. Ess.*, p. 313). One can also begin to see in their coincidence the principal flaw in arguments for the mimetic nature of his poems.

II

Mimesis in poetry can be understood as a matter of the scholastic *adequatio intellectus et rei* via the *tertium quid* of the poem. Read accordingly, and given

inscape as Hopkins's poetic aim, the "direct" treatment of a kestrel in "The Windhover" would result in a representation of its inscape, just as the rhythms of "The Wreck of the Deutschland" would conjure "an aural experience in the reader to imitate what she would experience if, say, she were actually on that rolling ship" (Sobolev, p. 293).[18] But it was an alternative to this representational model itself that Hopkins and Heidegger found in Scotus and that Hopkins enacted in poems and theorized in the short lecture "On Poetry and Verse." He composed and delivered the lecture (at Roehampton) between 1873 and 1874, which is to say at least a year after he read Scotus for the first time.[19] Mimetic interpretations must contend not only with his poems' many representational obscurities but with this lecture's claims about the nature of poetry: "Poetry is speech framed for contemplation of the mind by the way of hearing or speech framed to be heard for its own sake and interest even over and above its interest of meaning. Some matter and meaning is essential to it but only as an element necessary to support and employ the shape which is contemplated for its own sake" (*JP*, p. 289). The emphasis in this passage falls altogether on the sonic, for which semantic meaning is only a kind of prop. The crucial claim follows: "Poetry is in fact speech only employed to carry the inscape of speech for the inscape's sake—and therefore the inscape must be dwelt on" (*JP*, p. 289). It is not the inscapes of kingfishers or windhovers that poetry evokes but those of spoken language. It does so by repetition: "*oftening*, *over-and-overing*, *aftering* of the inscape must take place in order to detach it to the mind and in this light poetry is speech which afters and oftens its inscape, speech couched in a repeating figure and verse is spoken sound having a repeating figure" (*JP*, p. 289). "Detach" is the decisive word. To become audible, speech's inscapes must be "detached" by different kinds of repetition from "the grammatical, historical, and logical meaning[s]" of words. This process resembles what psycholinguistics terms "semantic satiation": repeating a word out loud and at length foregrounds its materiality to the detriment of its signification.[20] The extreme sonic density of Hopkins's poems is meant to background the words' semantic meanings in order to highlight meaning of another kind. They accord, therefore, with the foregoing description of inscape: their singular effects result from the patterned iteration of their parts, in this case the sounds of their words. The difference falls not between meaning and meaninglessness but between two types of meaning. Detached *to* the mind, not from it, the inscapes of speech become apparent apart from the concepts that normally occlude them.[21]

The highly redundant passages of a poem such as "The Leaden Echo and the Golden Echo" make blatant the emphasis on speech's inscapes:

> Give beauty back, beauty, beauty, beauty, back to God, beauty's self and beauty's giver.
> See: not a hair is, not an eyelash, not the last lash lost; every hair
> Is, hair of the head, numbered. (*PW*, p. 170; ll. 35–37)

Hopkins tellingly claimed that he "never [wrote] anything more musical" (*Corres.*, 2: 822), and it is indeed difficult to justify the repetition of "beauty" five times in one line on other than musical grounds, especially since it violates Hopkins's explicit belief in poetic economy. Defending "sprung rhythm," he argued, "for why, if it ^is^ forcible in prose to say 'lashed: rod,' am I obliged ~~in verse~~ to weaken this in verse, which ought to be stronger, not weaker, in to 'láshed birch-ród' or something?" (*Corres.*, 1: 282). If Hopkins wanted poetry to be at least as concise as prose, then one can explain this poem's flouting of concision only by recourse to a poetics that subordinates the demand for it to a demand for sonic vehemence.

But harping on abstractions with little descriptive force—"beauty," "despair"—makes "The Leaden Echo and the Golden Echo" too easy a target for antimimetic arguments. What of a sonnet such as "As kingfishers catch fire, dragonflies draw flame," with its exuberant catalog of concretions?

> As kingfishers catch fire, dragonflies draw flame;
> As tumbled over rim in roundy wells
> Stones ring; like each tucked string tells, each hung bell's
> Bow swung finds tongue to fling out broad its name;
> Each mortal thing does one thing and the same:
> Deals out that being indoors each one dwells;
> Selves—goes its self; *myself* it speaks and spells,
> Crying *What I do is me: for that I came.* (*PW*, p. 141; ll. 1–8)

Although undoubtedly about their "selves," the poem renders its birds, insects, rocks, and people rather imprecisely. There is in it no "exact vision of the world in all its transient uniqueness" such as we find in the *Diaries* (Sobolev, p. 45). Rather, Hopkins's language, in its will to sonority, makes the visible a little hard to see. The image of the bell's clapper as its "bow" makes little mimetic sense;[22] but the word alliterates with the preceding "bell," and its final *w* is in consonance with that of "swung." And while one can swing a bell's clapper and not the bell proper, one does not usually swing a bow, but the internal rhyme of "swung" and "tongue" justifies the odd choice of verb sonically. The first line is driven by like considerations: whatever it may mean or look like for kingfishers

to "catch fire," it is clear that the *k* and *f* sounds of "kingfishers" are "dealt out" into the *c* of "catch" and the *f* of "fire," as the *dr* and *fl* of "dragonflies" become those of "draw" and "flame." Similarly, each mortal thing's being is made to dwell "indoors," a peculiar architectural metaphor, in part because the adverb alliterates with "deals" and "dwells," and each must both "speak" and "spell" itself also for reasons of alliteration. It is not that Hopkins completely fails to be figurally faithful, or that his imprecise language makes "Kingfishers" impossible to parse, but that representation is secondary to the poem's sound motifs. One who had never seen a kingfisher would get no very precise sense of it—to say nothing of its inscape—from this poem, but no sensitive reader can fail to recognize the intensity of the speaker's *perception* of it, which is such that it beggars questions of verisimilitude.

The same inexactitude as a by-product of ardor is on display in Hopkins's most famous avian paean:

> I caught this morning morning's minion, king-
> dom of daylight's dauphin, dapple-dawn-drawn Falcon, in his riding
> Of the rolling level underneath him steady air, and striding
> High there, how he rung upon the rein of a wimpling wing
> In his ecstasy! (*PW*, p. 144; ll. 1–5)

There is certainly a sense in these lines of the bird counteracting the "big wind" as a rider counteracts a horse's motion by pulling on the reins, but again the figure proves confusing upon analysis. For instance, reins are separate from a rider in a way that a bird's wings are not from its body. Nevertheless, the unmistakable transport of the speaker, telegraphed in moments such as the famous run of *d* words in the second line, obviates such reasoning. The poem does not chiefly represent the inscape of the bird or its motion but presents its own aural inscape in order to impart to the reader a sense of the experience of inscape as such.

And this experience, achieved through a particular poem's inscape, is that of instress. Leveraging the reciprocal relation between the two, Hopkins aimed to create linguistic inscapes pronounced enough to conduce to instress. Like the "swelling buds" he describes in a journal entry, which raise the individuality of springtime trees to such a "pitch" that it becomes unmistakable, his poems are designed to call up the "world of inscape" latent in words by repeating their sounds and so separating them from their grammatical, historical, and logical meanings (*Diaries*, pp. 505–506). In Heideggerian terms, he effects a "reversal in conceptuality" by dwelling on spoken sounds and thereby

bringing the materiality of language and the singularity of the poem into relief. The conventional, conceptual sense of words "gets the worst of it" in his pursuit of a more immediate kind of sense and its concomitant form of absorption.

But unlike Heidegger's early project, which was more epistemological in nature, Hopkins's material poetics had an ultimately moral significance. "Binsey Poplars," a poem that equates the loss of beauty with the loss of the eye needed to see beauty, turns on a question of morality:

> Since Country is so tender
> To touch, her being so slender,
> That, like this sleek and seeing ball
> But a prick will make no eye at all[.] (*PW*, pp. 156–157; ll. 13–16)

A pricked eye is analogous to a denuded landscape: being physically unable to *see* is like having nothing *to* see. Commonsensically, inscapes of things cannot persist beyond the things themselves, a circumstance Hopkins laments in writing of an ashtree's felling, after which he "wished to die and not to see the inscapes of the world destroyed any more" (*Diaries*, p. 549). Only for someone as capable of instress as Hopkins, and thus as sensitized to inscape's absence, is such destruction twofold, foreclosing both the experiences of beauty that would render things worth saving and the development of sensitivity to their beauty out of those experiences. On an ecological scale, it leads to what Mark Payne describes as a gruesome feedback loop, in which "the more of earth [humanity] ruins, the less understanding it has of the heartfelt care it ought to show for Creation, and the less understanding it has of this care, the more of the earth it ruins."[23] In "Binsey Poplars," the "After-comers," who cannot "guess the beauty been" in this particular spot in Oxford, figure the large-scale indifference that partially motivates this cycle.

Payne considers whether the poem's rendering of the trees can communicate the beautiful selfhood Hopkins ascribes to them. He concludes it cannot: "a poem . . . can provide what the trees gave to the encounter between human and nonhuman life even less adequately than an epitaph for a human being can recall the person it commemorates" (p. 72). This reading is correct insofar as the poem does not represent the trees' irreplaceable individualities—as "airy cages," they are as hard to discern as windhover and kingfisher[24]—but omits its intervention in the downward spiral of indifference and destruction by way of its own linguistic inscape. Its last lines, "The sweet especial scene, / Rural scene, a rural scene, / Sweet especial rural scene" (*PW*, p. 157), exemplify

a Hopkinsian dwelling on inscape, as does "All felled, felled, are all felled." Syntactically and imagistically odd constructions such as "of a fresh and following folded rank" and "That dandaled a sandalled / Shadow that swam or sank" more subtly evince the same strategy. Absent the trees themselves, Hopkins tries to make language elicit the sort of attentiveness in which we might apprehend their beauty. Thus his poetry becomes a kind of training in instress via inscape, an attempt to heighten his reader's receptivity to the world, that one might perceive it more fully and value it more dearly.

For Hopkins, this meant perceiving the world's suffusion with Christ: "Since, though he is under the world's splendour and wonder, / His mystery must be instressed, stressed": instress is almost a Christian duty (*PW*, p. 120; ll. 38–39). And yet the impact of his poetry on nonbelievers suggests the broad power of his technique, which has language at its center and not doctrine. In this lies the technique's enduring novelty. Hopkins did not strive to put into words the "material conceptuality" of the world that Heidegger first sought in historical forms of life but to find it *in* words themselves, in the sounds by which they mean materially and intuitively. In Scotist terms, his poetry seeks to make perception run from conceptuality back toward sensorial immediacy, from scholastic "nature" toward inimitable *thisness*. In the poetics of inscape, language, that which so often bears concepts into the hearts of things, is made to bring about the kind of perception in which, preconceptually, they may readily disclose themselves as they singularly are.

Notes

1 Philip A. Ballinger, *The Poem as Sacrament: The Theological Aesthetic of Gerard Manley Hopkins* (Louven, Belgium: Peeters, 2000), p. 140.

2 Gerard Manley Hopkins, *The Journals and Papers of Gerard Manley Hopkins*, ed. Humphrey House and Graham Storey (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1959), p. 289. Hereafter cited as *JP*.

3 Instress almost encompasses being itself in Hopkins's earliest usages. The range of critics' interpretations is quite wide: Bernadette Ward claims that instress is "nearly coextensive with" the scholastic notion of *intentio*, while Daniel Brown holds that Hopkins drew the idea from nineteenth-century physics, hydrology in particular. Ward, *World as Word: Philosophical Theology in Gerard Manley Hopkins* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 2002), p. 200; Brown, *Hopkins' Idealism: Philosophy, Physics, Poetry* (Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon, 1997), p. 230.

4 According to James Cotter, inscape is the "intuition of the One through individual concrete existences." Cotter, *Inscape: The Christology and Poetry of Gerard Manley Hopkins* (Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 1972), p. 18.

5 Both Denis Sobolev and Bernadette Ward overlook this intuitiveness on the way to very different definitions of inscape. For Sobolev, very broadly, inscape is "embodied organized form"; Ward, conversely, narrows inscape's meaning dramatically. For her, it "correspond[s] nearly exactly to . . . *formalitates*," a concept of Duns Scotus. "Formalities" are the product of his "formal distinction," the middle ground between a "real distinction," which does not require a mental act in order to hold (the distinction between two separate words on a page), and a "mental distinction," which does (that between a written argument's premise and conclusion). He distinguishes by it essential aspects of a thing that are ultimately indistinguishable, such as the will and the intellect in humans. *Haecceitas* is itself a formality, that by which a thing can be understood as totally singular while still participating in a common nature. Sobolev, *The Split World of Gerard Manley Hopkins: An Essay in Semiotic Phenomenology* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 2011), p. 37; Ward, *World as Word*, pp. 162–163.

6 On the primacy of perception in Scotus and Hopkins, and the contrast between Scotus and Aquinas, see Justus Lawler, *Hopkins Re-constructed: Life, Poetry, and the Tradition* (New York: Continuum, 1998), p. 188.

7 Richard Cross, *Duns Scotus's Theory of Cognition* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2014), pp. 49–50.

8 This seems to be a misspelling; one clearly reads in this term the indexical "ecce" of "Ecce homo"—translated as "here" or "behold"—which is compatible with the indexical nature of Scotus's concept.

9 John Pick pointed this out in 1942. See Pick, *Gerard Manley Hopkins, Priest and Poet* (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1942), p. 35. Nonetheless, the conflating continued: in 1970, W. A. M. Peters declared that "inscape precisely covers what Scotus calls *haecceitas*." See Peters, *Gerard Manley Hopkins: A Critical Essay towards the Understanding of His Poetry* (Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell, 1970), p. 23.

10 "That [the singular] is not understood *per se* by our intellect, then, is not due to anything on the side of the singular but stems from the imperfection of our intellect—just as the inability of the owl to see the sun is on the part of the owl, not the sun." John Duns Scotus, *Early Oxford Lecture on Individuation*, ed. and trans. Allan Wolter (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 2005), p. 91.

11 "Inscape" and "instress" both appear in a brief essay on Parmenides written in 1868; Hopkins did not read Scotus until 1872.

12 Eric Daryl Meyer, "Incarnation and Omnipresence: Hopkins, Scotus, Particularity and Pantheism," *Hopkins Quarterly* 34 (Summer–Fall 2007): 102–116.

13 Hubert Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's "Being and Time," Division I* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991), p. 30.

14 Martin Heidegger, *Duns Scotus' Theory of the Categories and of Meaning*, trans. Harold Robbins (PhD diss., De Paul University, 1978), pp. 69–70.

15 S. J. McGrath, "The Forgetting of *Haecceitas*: Heidegger's 1915–1916 *Habilitationsschrift*," in *Between the Human and the Divine: Philosophical and Theological Hermeneutics*, ed. Andrzej Wierciński (Toronto: Hermeneutic, 2002), p. 369; emphasis in original.

16 John van Buren, *The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1994), p. 109.

17 "Subject and object as relational entities become most fully themselves *through the instressing act of perception*: the subject in being able to perceive, the object in simply being, and thereby possessing that which allows it to be perceived." Brian J. Day, "Hopkins' Spiritual Ecology in 'Binsey Poplars,'" *VP* 2 (2004): 181–193. The "*instressing act of perception*" (emphasis in the original) and "inscaping" are thus equivalent.

18 See also Summer J. Star, "'For the inscape's sake': Sounding the Self in the Meters of Gerard Manley Hopkins," in *Meter Matters: Verse Cultures of the Long Nineteenth Century*, ed. Jason David Hall (Athens: Ohio Univ. Press, 2011), p. 162; Geoffrey Hartman, "The Dialectic of Sense Perception," in *Hopkins: A Collection of Critical Essays* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 119; Cotter, *Inscape*, pp. 150, 177; Paul Mariani, *A Commentary on the Complete Poems of Gerard Manley Hopkins* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1970), p. 240. For an opposing view, see Elizabeth Helsinger, *Poetry and the Thought of Song in Nineteenth-Century Britain* (Charlottesville: Univ. of Virginia Press, 2015), p. 59.

19 This and another lecture were made to be delivered while Hopkins was professor of rhetoric at Manresa House, Roehampton, between September 1873 and July 1874. See *JP*, pp. xviii–xxx.

20 Stuart Sutherland, *The Macmillan Dictionary of Psychology*, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke, U.K.: Macmillan, 1995), p. 418. See also Blasing, *Lyric Poetry: The Pain and the Pleasure of Words* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 2007).

21 As Mutlu Konuk Blasing suggests, "poetry foregrounds a linguistic nonrational that is not a byproduct of reason; rather, it is the ground on which rational language and disciplinary discourses carve their territories." Blasing, *Lyric Poetry*, p. 3.

22 "Bow, n. 1": "A ring or hoop of metal, etc. forming a handle" (*OED*).

23 Mark Payne, *The Animal Part: Human and Other Animals in the Poetic Imagination* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2010), p. 72.

24 Norman MacKenzie suggests that the poplars are bars behind which the sun appears "like a fierce animal *quelled* by captivity"; Day suggests the leaves are cages that "quell" and "quench" the sunlight in the act of photosynthesis, a concept familiar to Hopkins. MacKenzie, *A Reader's Guide to Gerard Manley Hopkins* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1981), p. 108; Day, "Hopkins' Spiritual Ecology," p. 188.